Distrust in Government Leaders and Preference for Elections in Rural China.

Drawing on survey data, the paper shows that Chinese villagers who have weaker trust in government leaders have stronger preference for popular elections. It argues that distrust in leaders stimulates preference for elections rather than the other way around. It further argues that distrust in leaders generates wishes for leadership changes, which in turn result in preference for elections. It is also argued that preference for popular elections amounts in effect to preference for a system change in China, to the extent that such elections may jeopardize one-party rule. As regards the theoretical debate on whether distrust in government induces preference for regime change, the China case suggests that two mechanisms are at work. The extent to which ordinary people can engineer leadership changes through institutionalized channels affects the generation of idealistic wishes for a better system. Perceived availability of better and viable alternative systems affects whether idealistic wishes for a better system materialize into realistic preferences for system change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]