The Case against Chinese Exceptionalism: Confucian Culture and the Use of Force.

The call for a Chinese school of international relations arises from the alleged inability of existing theories to explain the Chinese experience—China's Confucian culture has produced a fundamentally different experience from that of the West. The central question of this article is thus: To what extent does Confucian culture influence China's use of military force against external security threats? By examining Song China's relations with the Liao empire during the crucial years of 960-1005, I argue that, despite having a pacifist Confucian culture, China has been acting like a realist power in Asia, expanding its political and military interests as its power grew. By doing so, this article makes the case against Chinese exceptionalism. Chinese use of force was rooted in the structure of the system; culture played a supplementary role in China's military policy. Despite having different cultures, the Chinese experience was no less different from that of the West: both were driven by the anarchic structure of the system. I consult primary documents in the Chinese archives, supplemented by secondary literature, and examine the decision-making process leading up to the use or non-use of force. Contrary to what is widely believed, China had behaved according to the dictates of structural realism. It had preferred to use force to resolve external threats to Chinese security, adopted a more offensive posture as its power grew, and expanded war aims in the absence of systemic or military constraints. In the end, Western IR theory does a reasonably good job of explaining the Chinese experience. There is little need for a Chinese school of international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]