A Tale of Two Crises: Anti-American Protest and U.S.-China Relations in 1999 and 2001.

This paper begins with an empirical puzzle. Why were anti-American protests allowed after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, but prevented after the 2001 collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet? I argue that the critical difference between these two crises was the bilateral bargaining context. The Chinese government viewed the 1999 bombing as a deliberate provocation to test China's resolve at a time of acrimonious negotiations over China's entry into the World Trade Organization. By contrast, the 2001 plane collision occurred soon after George W. Bush took office, when Chinese diplomacy was aimed at reducing the perception that China posed a threat to the United States. However, fearing that anti-foreign protests would lead to anti-government protests in 1999, the Chinese government orchestrated the anti-American demonstrations with a visible hand and undermined the perception that the protests posed a genuine risk. As a result, U.S. officials discounted the protests and warned the Chinese government not to use the bombing to gain leverage on other issues, such as China's entry into the WTO or U.N. negotiations over Kosovo. By stage-managing the protests, the Chinese government reduced the efficacy of protests as a bargaining tactic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]