KİRLİLİK OLİŞTURAN OLİGOPOL PİYASALARININ TAHMİNİ DEĞİŞİM METODU KULLANILARAK VERGİLENDİRİLMESİ.

This study is about to examine how regulators can be benefited from conjectural variation method to prevent pollution while taxing firms in oligopoly markets. In this paper, it is assumed that regulators have perfect information about demand, cost and the technologies that firms use to reduce pollution. On the other hand, the level of the optimal rate of taxation is ignored. The basis for conjectural variation method is constituted by the reactions of firms towards each others' behaviors. By looking at these reactions, regulators can easily determine whether a firm behaves according to Bertrand, Cournot or Cartel models. And, this helps to reduce pollution significantly by increasing the impact of emission tax. Although the structure of markets is a significant factor in the measurement of the social cost of tax, some problems are confronted when calculating that cost. In addition, it has been observed ad valorem taxation is superior to specific taxation in terms of welfare in oligopolistic markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]