No Development, No Peace? Demobilization and Reintegration in the Casamance.

In a sub-region synonymous with political crises and violent regional conflicts, the Casamance war has managed to fly under the international radar despite being one of the longest running civil wars in the region of West Africa. In comparison with the vast war economies generated in countries of the Mano River Union during the 1990s, the rebel forces of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) have been able to sustain their efforts on a subsistence war economy of cashews, timber, cannabis, war 'tax' and banditry. Indeed, it is curious how the conflict, which has lasted more than 20 years, managed to continue for so long. Attempts by the government of Senegal to bring the conflict to an end have been constantly thwarted by deadlocks in negotiations, mistrust, and resurgence in violence. This paper examines the ongoing peacebuilding process in the Casamance, in particular the practice of using demobilization and reintegration programs and other development assistance as key inducements to reign in spoilers during the peace process. While much of the war termination literature extols the use of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to kick-start the establishment of a political economy of peace, it is questionable whether sequencing demobilization and reintegration prior to disarmament can foster an environment of greater security. This paper illustrates this point with a case study of the Casamance conflict. Although the government of Senegal was successful in using donor-sponsored development assistance to foster factionalism within the MFDC in 1992, the strategy barely contributed to addressing the main socio-economic grievances of the rebels. Instead, it created a system of de-legitimization, which has negated the prospects of a genuine disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program as part of the peacebuilding process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]