Why Comply? State Compliance to International Trade and Environmental Law in the European Union.

International legislative agreements have become a central mode of governance at the supranational level. The European Union has emerged as a regulatory state enabling the efficient and institutionalized coordination of international legislation in Europe. The regulatory nature of the European Community implies such political systems derive their efficiency and legitimacy through compliance with international laws by member States. However, although member states have engaged in such form of international agreement through voluntary treaty ratification and institutional bargaining, the European Union has been reported to suffer from an implementation deficit whereby national states may fail to comply with their obligation. This paper addresses the issue of state compliance to supranational law by focusing on the European Union political system through cross-country analysis of the application of EU directives promoting trade and environmental agreements since 1980. Trade and environmental policies have high political salience. They define the current context of economic competition and reduce the negative externalities of market mechanism at the national and European level for member states. Using econometric techniques the following research finds functional institutional designs delegating enforcement mechanisms to non-state actors are the main determinant of state compliance. In addition, variances in observed levels of compliance are not the product of rational cost benefit calculations alone and are determined by institutional capabilities and learning. This papers draw empirically verifiable recommendations for the design of efficient institutional models of governance and should provide valuable implications for EU and international political economy research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]