A Theory of Collective Security Alliances: A Case of Incomplete Pacific Pacts.

This paper aims to test a theory of collective security alliances against evidence of Asia-Pacific states' alliance formation behaviors in the early Cold War period. Specifically, I attempt to study why a multilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific, namely a Pacific Pact did not materialize despite the fact many of Asia-Pacific states including the United States considered seriously and took initiative in developing such a pact. This puzzle is particularly interesting given the Western European states successfully developed a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Why did a Pacific Pact failed, while NATO succeeded?The paper analyzes a case of decision-making and behaviors of potential allies and major stakeholders for forming a multilateral alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly those of the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) of the period from March 1949 to September 1951. This timeframe was chosen, because some of Asia-Pacific states developed their interest in building a multilateral alliance in their region after the North Atlantic Treat was signed in April 1949, and a possibility of building multilateral security alliance was abandoned but instead, two bilateral and one trilateral alliances were signed in August and September 1951.Before going into further discussion, note that this paper is interested not in a multilateral alliance with three or more member sates, but a multilateral alliance that possesses the feature of indivisible security. From now on, this paper merely calls the former type of alliance a multilateral alliance but names the latter type as a collective security alliance. Specifically, NATO is a multilateral alliance as well as a collective security alliance, while ANZUS or SEATO is a multilateral alliance but not a collective security alliance according to this paper's definition. In fact, this conception of a multilateral and collective security alliance is not new. For instance, Hemmer and Katzenstein does not treat the SEATO as a multilateral alliance, although more than five states constituted the alliance, because they consider that SEATO is more like a series of bilateral alliances . For the same reason, this paper regards ANZUS as a multilateral alliance but not as a collective security alliance.In general, the existence of a threat or hostile power is a necessary condition for developing a collective security alliance, since a collective security is one type of alliances. However, the balance of threat theory does not predict what type of alliances such as bilateral, multilateral or collective security alliances will be formed. A collective security alliance would be likely to develop if two or more great powers are willing to bear an extra burden of providing security to other states and regions as well as to its own territory, and also if they are willing to restrain their freedom of action in order to balance against external threats. Empirical Evidence shows that the Department of States and Defense started drafting a Pacific Pact with features of a collective security alliance at the end of 1950 when the U.S. government found the Communist expansion most threatening at the end of 1950. Also, the United States started discussing this Pacific Pact proposal with relevant Asia-Pacific states at the beginning of 1951. The heightened perception of threat surely drove a state to form an alliance. However, historical evidence shows that perceived threat is necessary, but not sufficient for forming a collective security alliance as a conclusion... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]