From Decentralized Developmental State To Authoritarian Regulatory State:A Case Study on Drug Safety Regulation in China.

This paper attempts to answer three questions about contemporary Chinese political economy system: As a long-time commanding state and decentralized developmental state, for what causes Chinese government decided to perform regulatory reform policies and build a regulatory state in mid-1990s? What kind of structural obstacles will Chinese regulatory state building meet and face? Which unique characteristics does Chinese regulatory state possess? By taking drug safety regulation as a typical case of risk regulation, this article will provide a series of replies accordingly as below: It is the collapse of Interest Community of Government, Enterprise and Shiye Unit (ICGES) that fosters the regulatory state rising in contemporary China. Nowadays, three major structural obstacles are threatening Chinese regulatory state building due to the path dependence of its previous political economy system: problematic regulatory independence caused by decentralized developmentalism, administrative-relied regulatory style affected by commanding economy model and rent-seeking orientation of regulatory corruption brought by authoritarian political system. Therefore, the author is inclined to employ a term of "authoritarian regulatory state" to define the characteristics of current Chinese regulatory state in contrast to general regulatory states based on well-rounded market economy and democratic political system. If the readers agree with this analytical framework, we can argue that Chinese regulatory state building in still on the road from the case of drug safety regulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]