Constructing Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific: Can China, Japan, and the United States Overcome Geopolitical Constraints?

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]