When Do Territorial Disputes Become Indivisible? Domestic Sources of Japanese Territorial Policy After the Cold War.

When do interstate territorial disputes become indivisible and heighten the tension among the disputing parties? Under what conditions does an indivisible territorial issue become divisible, which fosters cooperation among states involved in the dispute? The conventional wisdom tells us that an indivisible territory is an obstacle to rational settlement. Furthermore, the indivisibility of the territorial issue is likely to cause the escalation of territorial disputes, sometimes to militarized conflict, and undermines the possibility of cooperation. However, it is not clear under what conditions the territorial issue is considered as indivisible among the disputing parties. We re-examine the relationship between the indivisibility and the territorial values (material and ideational ones) which we will argue fluctuates with domestic conditions. We focus on roles that domestic coalitions play in determining whether territoriality is indivisible or not by analyzing three territorial disputes in which Japan has been involved for the last two decades: the Northern Islands with Russia (the former Soviet Union); the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands with China; and Takeshima / Dokdo with South Korea. We will scrutinize how and why an internationalist coalition in the domestic political climate prevents the Japanese government from setting the territorial issue indivisible and seeks for a soft-landing policy, while a nationalist coalition contributes to clinging to the indivisibility of the territorial issue and takes an assertive policy. Our research will contribute to bridging the gap between the rationalist approach to territorial conflict and the ideational approach by focusing on the (in)divisibility of territoriality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]