The North Korean Nuclear Crises: Deterrence and Reassurance.

During the past two decades North Korea's nuclear ambitions have created several crises. North Korea's motives have appeared to be very ambiguous since the first launch of its nuclear program. The North Koreans, on the one hand, could feel tangible security threat from the coercive policies of U.S. Thereby, their inconsistent behaviors might be an instinctive reaction to them, just as they have repeatedly justified. On the other hand, North Korea might intend to take advantage of each crisis to achieve extra political and economic goals as the Bush Administration has claimed. Given the secretive nature of North Korean regime, uncertainty of North Korea's strategic targets in several nuclear crises plays an important role in evaluating the nature of North Korea crises. In retrospect to the history of Korean Peninsula, this paper argues that North Korea displays dual characteristics of both aggressiveness and insecurity, making it hard to determine North Korea's real motives and to devise proper policies. As an insecure state, North Korea is motivated to resort to nuclear weapons to protect the ruling of communist party against perceived U.S. threats after the Korean War. In other words, North Korea's insecurity is partially indigenous. Otherwise, as a greedy state, North Korea combines economic and political interests with security concerns to maximize its gain in each crisis. Although North Korea's wants of nuclear weapons are primarily defensive, its greedy intention has been continuously proved by concrete evidences. As a result, it is difficult to manage with such a state by either cooperative or competitive policies. That Clinton Administration and Bush Administration have made the alternative choice between reassurance and deterrence is a false one. Complete cooperation with North Korea without the strength of effective deterrence makes U.S. appear too exploitable. Without reassuring its core security concerns, coercive policies towards North Korea increase its insecurity and compel it to be more aggressive. Mixing effective deterrence and credible assurance is a more sophisticate choice. China, as a main stake holder, should be more concerned about the advancing nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea. Given the implicit historical relations between China and North Korea, an effective deterrence policy carried out by the United States towards North Korea needs to combine with the reassurance from China. A nuclear neighbor country will significantly change the strategic environment of China over the long haul by destabilizing Korea Peninsula's status. As a rising regional power, China should reevaluate its national security interest in Korea Peninsula in the long term and clearly display its resolve to maintain the stability of East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]