The Social Costs of Voting in Public: A Field Experiment of Voter Turnout in the 2008 Iowa Caucus.

Does voting in public increase or depress turnout? We present a theory of the effect of social pressure on voter turnout, arguing that both social costs and social benefits can affect individual behavior. We test our theory by conducting a randomized field experiment during the 2008 Iowa Democratic presidential caucus, sending mailers to registered Democrats suggesting different reasons for voting. We include three treatments: (1) one telling citizens of the date, time, and location of the caucus; (2) one telling citizens the caucus is a public meeting where neighbors and friends will be attending; and (3) one telling citizens that the caucus does not have a secret ballot and that their neighbors and friends will be attending. We find that citizens are more likely to vote when information costs are reduced and when they are told the caucus is a public meeting. However, we find that turnout is reduced when citizens are told their vote choices must be revealed to their neighbors. To our knowledge, this is the first field experiment where a treatment has resulted in suppression of the vote relative to other treatment effects. These findings provide insights into individual behavior in a social context, a rejection of one explanation for heavy voter turnout in 19th century America, and practical insights for campaigns interested in mobilizing voters to presidential caucuses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]