The Lebanese Conflict Trap: Confessional Impediments to Institutionalized Peace.

To what extent can electoral systems reinforce or undermine the conflict dampening potential of power sharing arrangements in divided, post-conflict states? Despite previous research that highlights the potential for democratic institutions to defuse inter-sectarian conflict, particularly power sharing arrangements and electoral frameworks, central questions remain regarding how varying mechanisms work in combination to either defuse or exacerbate domestic conflict and whether particular institutions may work to either reinforce or undermine other mechanisms or democracy in general. In contributing to research on democratic peacebuilding, this paper explores the interactive relationship between power sharing and electoral systems in the fragmented, confessional environment of post-war Lebanon. As one of the longest-running cases of continuous institutional engineering in the region, Lebanon offers not only a rich exploratory case in which to evaluate institutional interactions and the impact on inter-communal conflict, but also salient insight into power sharing initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as intra-state conflict outside the region. Investigating several institutional configurations over time, the paper assesses the hypothesis that a confessional electoral system stymies executive and legislative power sharing, while undermining genuine democratic participation and competition, thus negating the ability of democratic mechanisms to facilitate meaningful conflict resolution. Moreover, the research explores the extent to which consequent erosion in government legitimacy, combined with a weakened executive, impedes the ability of the state to mediate inter-group conflicts or promote national unity effectively in the face of destabilizing forces from domestic and regional/international arenas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]