Domestic Politics and the Accession of Authoritarian Regimes to Human Rights Treaties.

A common claim in international relations theory holds that states will only join those international institutions with those regulations they intend to comply (Downs, Rocke & Barsoom 1996). In this paper, we oer a demonstration of when this claim might not hold. We construct a model of an authoritarian government's decision to accede to a human rights treaty. We demonstrate that authoritarian governments may use the signing of this treaty - followed by the willful violation of its provisions - as a costly signal to domestic opposition groups of their willingness to employ repressive tactics to remain in power. In equilibrium, we find that authoritarian governments that torture more are more likely to sign the treaty than those that torture less, as is consistent with Hathaway's (2007) empirical findings regarding the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We further predict that signatory regimes should enjoy longer terms in office than non-signatories - and we provide empirical support for this prediction. The model further suggests that CAT accession may reduce levels of torture; though many empirical tests may miss this relationship due to selection effects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]