Controlling the State after Transition: Explaining Choice Mechanisms for State Accountability in Asia.

Holding elections and changing executives and legislators does not necessarily shift the behavior of the state and hence increase accountability. An important problem for politicians in new democracies is how to control the state apparatus. This paper examines the different ways that politicians try to restructure the state in Asia (comparative case studies of Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand) so as to increase the state's accountability to citizens and elected politicians. What explains the variance in the extent to which new governments attempt to restructure the lines of accountability of the state? I argue that democratic transitions in which the executive’s preferences are aligned with the status quo elements in the bureaucracy, are characterized by continuity in structure and process and the government will seek to maintain or strengthen executive control. But where the government faces a bureaucracy with divergent preferences and has legislative support, it will attack these entrenched interests by adopting various accountability mechanisms, including independent pro-accountability agencies, administrative procedures, and co-governance arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]