Political Inheritance under the Single Non-transferable Vote Electoral System in Japan.

In this paper, I investigate the trends in political inheritance in Japan from 1947-1993, the postwar time period during which Japan employed the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system. While SNTV did not allow for the transfer of votes, a great deal of transfers of political resources occurred between generations of politicians. I first address the determinants of political transfer between one politician and another, and when such transfers are likely to occur between family members. Second, I investigate whether the resource advantages that led hereditary candidates to run for their predecessors' seats actually resulted in greater electoral success. I find that the predominance of hereditary politicians in Japan under SNTV was largely the result of supply and demand incentives in the recruitment process, and that hereditary candidates were especially likely to be nominated when they were succeeding politicians who served many terms, were hereditary candidates themselves, or died in office. My research greatly improves upon previous work done on hereditary politicians in Japan by including data on all candidates, all related and non-related transfers, and expanded control variables. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]