Linked Strategies: How Network Connectivity Affects Individual Strategies in a Coordination Game.

The literature on the effects of networks in politics and economics usually focuses on the relationship between network structure and aggregate outcomes. In this paper we turn our attention to the effect that network structure has on individual strategy. We utilize an experimental approach that allows us to identify the causal effect of changes in network structure on individual behavior. We demonstrate that individuals change their strategy in a network coordination game based on their position in the network. We show that when individuals are in a position with a large number of connections they are less likely to choose a “stick” strategy than when they are in a position with only a few connections. In networks with high connectivity a smaller proportion of individuals will also choose to adopt a “stick” strategy. The experimental results provide causal evidence that network position and structure affect the strategies chosen by individuals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]