Strategic Behavior in Imperialist Interstate Conflict: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.

This paper aims to present a game-theoretic analysis of interstate conflict in modern East Asia involving two countries: the countries of imperial expansion and the expansion reached. Focusing on historical junctures whereby imperial expansion reached and conflicted with China, Japan, and Korea, it addresses two questions about the dynamics. The first concerns a variety of outcomes: why did some conflicts end up with peaceful treaty while others escalated to armed conflict? The second concerns the rules of the game: how can we properly understand the process in which players act strategically? I explore these questions by using a model that allows me to identify factors that influence strategic behaviors of players. Two works are conducted: (1) to build up a generic 2×2 ordinal game, the structure of which is determined by two parameters, the attitude of target country toward foreign trade and the type of foreign power, (2) to analyze the process of conflict resolution using standard game theory and the theory of moves (TOM), which assume different rules of play. Consequently, I argue that TOM provides more coherent accounts for dynamic aspects of imperialist interstate conflict in modern East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]