Do Democracies Make Superior Counter-Terrorists? Revisited.

This paper builds upon previous work evaluating the strategic effectiveness of terrorism, specifically that of Abrahms (2006, 2007). It has been proposed that terrorism often is successful at winning policy concessions, and that democracies are particularly likely to grant policy concessions to terrorists. The evidence offered in this paper does not support either proposition. Campaigns of terror tend to be strategically ineffective and democracies seem to be particularly resistant to the demands of terrorists. There are several plausible reasons as to why this is the case. Respect for civil liberties places restraints on the type of counter-terrorism measures which may be employed by democracies; however, these restraints actually increase counter-terrorism’s effectiveness because it allows the target state to acquire and maintain the support of citizens, moderates, and the international community. Also, the deliberate targeting of civilians is a concept so far removed from liberal-democratic principles democracies will be particularly loath to reward this type of behavior with policy concessions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]