Bureaucratic Structure, Corruption, and State Effectiveness.

While the last two decades have seen a proliferation of comparative studies analyzing the impact of institutions over quality of government, most studies are geared towards the input side of the state. They examine the effect of democracy, electoral systems or veto players, factors dealing with incentives of those taking policy decisions, leaving a side the incentives of those implementing policies. Generally, we lack comparative studies of how public employees are selected and which incentives they have to deliver quality of government. With the exception of Rauch & Evans (2000), the literature has not taken into account the features of the output side of a state, such as the bureaucratic structure. But in turn, Rauch & Evans (2000) lacks control of factors of the input side of the state. This paper is bridging the gap between these two approaches by testing the bureaucratic structure hypothesis together with input-side factors. Data comes from a new expert survey covering more than 50 countries. Controlling for standard political variables, we check the impact that bureaucratic factors such as meritocratic recruitment, level of salaries and career stability have on effectiveness and corruption in the public sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]