An Optimal Stopping Model of Inter-Circuit Conflict.

One of the few stated criteria by which the Supreme Court decides to hear a case is the existence of a conflict among the regional judicial circuits. However, a circuit split does not automatically lead the Supreme Court to review a case, and the justices have often allowed circuit splits - and thereby the application of different legal standards across the country - to stand for long periods of time. What explains the Court's tolerance of circuit conflict, and its eventual decision to resolve a circuit split? We model the Supreme Court's decision to intervene in an inter-circuit conflict as an optimal stopping problem. The Court faces a strategic trade-off between allowing conflict to continue while learning about the implications of the possible policy choices and intervening to end a costly conflict between the circuits. Our model provides the first theoretical framework for understanding the Court's resolution of inter-circuit conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]