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Environmental protection in the federalist system: The political economy of NPDES inspections.
- Source :
-
Economic Inquiry . Apr98, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p305. 15p. 5 Charts. - Publication Year :
- 1998
-
Abstract
- Examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. Evaluation of three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy; Allowance of local interests to alter national standards; Examination of environmental protection policies; Violation and effluent discharge variables.
- Subjects :
- *FEDERAL government
*DELEGATION of authority
*ENVIRONMENTAL policy
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00952583
- Volume :
- 36
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Economic Inquiry
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 573489
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01716.x