Fast Discrete Fourier Spectra Attacks on Stream Ciphers.

In this paper, some new results are presented on the selective discrete Fourier spectra attack introduced first as the Rønjom–Helleseth attack and the modifications due to Rønjom, Gong, and Helleseth. The first part of this paper fills some gaps in the theory of analysis in terms of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). The second part introduces the new fast selective DFT attacks, which are closely related to the fast algebraic attacks in the literature. However, in contrast to the classical view that successful algebraic cryptanalysis of LFSR-based stream cipher depends on the degree of certain annihilators, the analysis in terms of the DFT spectral properties of the sequences generated by these functions is far more refined. It is shown that the selective DFT attack is more efficient than known methods for the case when the number of observed consecutive bits of a filter generator is less than the linear complexity of the sequence. Thus, by utilizing the natural representation imposed by the underlying LFSRs, in certain cases, the analysis in terms of DFT spectra is more efficient and has more flexibility than classical and fast algebraic attacks. Consequently, the new attack imposes a new criterion for the design of cryptographic strong Boolean functions, which is defined as the spectral immunity of a sequence or a Boolean function. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]