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Two-person ex post implementation
- Source :
-
Games & Economic Behavior . May2012, Vol. 75 Issue 1, p435-440. 6p. - Publication Year :
- 2012
-
Abstract
- Abstract: This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08998256
- Volume :
- 75
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Games & Economic Behavior
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 74468265
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006