Essentialism and the social.

In this paper I show that two senses are often assigned to essences in frameworks that award them a significant ontological status. There is both a defining sense and a more concrete-explanatory sense. Once this distinction is recognized, competing forms of essentialism can be differentiated and their implications more easily explored. As an example of work where the defining and the concrete-explanatory senses of essence are tied closely together I consider the essentialism outlined by Rom Harré as part of his analysis of the practices of natural scientists. As an illustration of a position where the two senses are de-coupled and priority given to the defining sense I examine the essentialism Charles Peirce develops in his mature account of natural classes. I show that arguments concerning the scope of essentialism and its relevance for the study of social phenomena depend heavily on the sense of essence prioritized. The focus on these two senses of essence facilitates a better understanding of the forms of essentialism defended by Harré and Peirce and helps identify the challenges contemporary realists face as they seek to defend an essentialism that applies to the social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]