Concentrated Powers: Unilateral Executive Authority and Fiscal Profligacy in the American States.

Although executive authority is a critical element in separation of powers systems, an excessive amount is not conducive for responsible policymaking behavior because it lowers executives' transaction costs to make policies that are compatible with their short-term electoral incentives at the expense of long-term prudence. We test this proposition by analyzing the relationship between unilateral executive control over fiscal policymaking and fiscal spending growth in the American states. The statistical evidence reveals that the level of unilateral executive control over fiscal policymaking represents a critical institutional source of per capita real general expenditure growth by U.S. state governments. These findings indicate that vesting concentrated policymaking authority with a unitary elected executive promotes fiscal profligacy. This study underscores the benefits associated with limiting unilateral executive control through shared policymaking authority arrangements in separation of powers systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]