Is it meaningful to juxtapose 'individual' and 'society'?

The opposition of individual and society lies at the foundation of theoretical thinking about the conditions for being human. Common views on social interaction fall prey to two opposing stances, that of sociological individualism and that of sociological universalism (terms central to the work of a German sociologist of the first half of the 20th century, Othmar Spann). The dilemma entailed in this opposition is closely related to the distinction between differentiation and integration. When this distinction is added to the problem, the initial problem is translated into a related one, namely that of the relation between action and order. In order to get a hold on these issues, preliminary questions, such as those related to the nature of reality and those accounting for the status of (scientific) knowledge, are treated. The distinction between rationalism and irrationalism appears to hinge upon the account one gives for the relationship between universality and individuality. This in turn, serves to elucidate the complex nature of nominalism, both in its opposition to realism and with regard to the foundational role it plays in respect of methodological individualism in social theory. After examining the conceptions of three classical sociological thinkers (Tönnies, Spencer and Durkheim), the paper argues that organicism may be advocated both in an individualistic and a universalistic fashion. A brief orientation is then given regarding the nature of analogical concepts, which is followed up by a treatment of the connection between universalism and biotical analogies, with reference to Parsons and Müinch. In conclusion a summary of the line of argumentation followed in this article is given with a view to a follow-up article which will propose an approach possibly capable of transcending the impasse of individualism and universalism in sociological theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]