Bargaining for value capturing: a game-theoretical analysis and experimental approach.

Value capturing is considered a promising additional way of funding public infrastructure development. However, its implementation is often problematic because the instruments that can be used for it (ie, taxes, fees, and other types of fiscal regulation) generally face a lack of support. An alternative approach to value capturing might be to stimulate the stakeholders to bargain over the distribution of the increment values. This paper presents an analysis of bargaining processes with respect to the implementation of value capturing based on concepts drawn from cooperative game theory in partition function form. The institutional setting of location development related to infrastructure development in the Netherlands is used to provide an empirical context to the analysis. As a validation, the game is played with experts in Dutch planning and infrastructure development practice. Our study shows that a game-theoretical approach offers a useful method to conceptualise relationships between different stakeholders and analyse the bargaining and negotiation processes to reach an agreement about an efficient and fair allocation of the increment land values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]