Early Warning of Intentions or of Capabilities? Revisiting the Israeli–Egyptian Rotem Affair, 1960.

A major school of thought in Israel asserts that: (1) a cornerstone of the Israeli security doctrine is gaining early warning based more on changes of the enemy's capabilities and less on learning its intentions; and (2) that deviation from the doctrine caused the strategic surprise experienced by the state on the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. This assertion is examined here by looking into another case in which Israel was also militarily surprised. In February 1960 the Egyptian Army deployed offensively along the joint border, while the IDF remained unaware of the situation. Israel's conduct during the affair – known as the Rotem Affair – was based on lenient assessments (derived from sigint) regarding the Egyptian intentions, ignoring their capabilities. It transpires, therefore, that dominance of ‘early warning of intentions’ has been the rule rather than the exception. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]