The Role of Financial Compensation in Managerial Motivation.

The following four papers are modified versions of papers delivered in a symposium titled "The Role of Financial Compensation in Managerial Motivation" held during the Spring, 1965 meetings of the Midwestern Psychological Association. Dunnette presents an instrumental model of managerial motivation and discusses its implications for research on the motivational effects of compensation. He also reviews research related to Preferences (motives) most often found to be salient for managers. Lawler summarizes previous research on the effects of secret salary policies on manager satisfaction and presents results of another recent study showing that policies of pay secrecy have several costs not generally recognized. Secrecy apparently blurs managers' perceptions of what others earn; they overestimate the salaries of peers and of subordinates and this can lead to greater pay dissatisfaction and the belief that job performance is rather unimportant in determining pay. Weick reviews the psychological literature bearing on the effects of insufficient rewards on the intensity of effort. He reviews evidence in support of the relationship, postulates several properties of experimental procedures to explain the effects, and suggests that propositions from frustration or cue-utilization theory may afford the most parsimonious explanation of the relationship. Finally, Opsahl provides an overview of current, knowledge about managerial compensation and its effect on managerial job behavior, and suggests areas in need of further intensive research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]