THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY AN ANALYSIS OF AGENCY QUIT RATES.

Can presidents use tools of political control to affect turnover at federal agencies? A large literature illustrates that presidents have a wide arsenal of tools to control the direction of policy outputs at federal agencies. Much of this research implies that presidents may influence the morale of bureaucrats with these tools of control, but it does not actually test this expectation. This paper extends the Administrative presidency literature by looking beyond policy outputs as the focus of presidential influence toward examining quit rates at federal agencies, a proxy for agency morale. I examine quarterly turnover data provided by the Office of Personnel Management from 1980 to 2000 for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Education. Even for the Reagan Administration, agency turnover is best explained by seasonal variation with most quits occurring in the final quarter of every fiscal year. Nevertheless, this paper produces evidence that agency turnover matters significantly to the level of agency outputs, suggesting that it is an important and practical consideration in examining the capacity of agencies to accomplish their policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]