Moderating Effects of Patronage in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

This paper outlines how patronage ties might moderate otherwise polarizing categories in politics, such as those based in religious ideology or ethnic identity. Patronage networks can serve as an informal institutional means to incorporate diverse actors into the control structures of the state, effectively co-opting potential rivals to state control. Patronage structures can have these moderating effects in both non-democracies and democracies. The form or structure of patronage networks matters greatly here - as incorporating important individuals into the hierarchy can serve as an important means to entice their cooperation. But the content of the ties is also relevant. Encouraging the pursuit of material or resource interests can reduce elites' focus on ideological or identity interests that could otherwise prove difficult for the state to control. They also emphasize shared interests. Elites can agree on the pursuit of wealth or power - shared interests that provide a counter to oppositional categories based on ideology or identity. We sketch how patronage control mechanisms work through a diverse array of examples from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]