¿EXISTE UNA MANERA DE COMPETENCIA DEFINIDA EN EL MERCADO DE LAS AFORE?

This paper aims at modeling Afore's strategies which are addressed to retain the largest number of pensioners with different income levels in a cost competition setting. In doing so, we simulate a non-cooperative static two stages game to model competition between M⩾ leaders and N followers by using a generalized Nash-Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium (GNCSE). The main findings state that: 1) competition among Afore is not only defined by an GNCSE (which performs well at explaining Afores performance for intermediate income levels); 2) when dealing with extreme income levels, it is advisable to analyze agents as price-fixing competitors -in low income ranks- or as non-price-quantity competitors -in high income ranks- instead of as quantity Stackelberg oligopolists; and 3) there is no a direct relationship between the number agents and pensioner's welfare in Mexico's Afore market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]