Back to Search
Start Over
Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?
- Source :
-
Yale Law Journal . Apr2014, Vol. 123 Issue 6, p1692-1730. 39p. - Publication Year :
- 2014
-
Abstract
- Courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, make important decisions about rights by voting, and often the decision is determined by a bare majority. But the principle of majority decision (MD) for courts has not been much reflected on. There is very little scholarly literature on this and only a handful of articles proposing alternatives to MD in the judicial context. So what justifies judges' reliance on MD? In democratic contexts, MD is usually defended on one of three grounds: (i) as a decision-procedure that is efficient; (ii) as a way of reaching the objectively best decision; or (iii) as a way of respecting the principle of political equality. However, it is difficult to see how any of these arguments really explains or justifies MD in the case of judicial decision-making. Regarding (i), other efficient procedures are available: we want to know why this sort of efficiency should be valued. On (ii), epistemic arguments for MD do not work well for the sort of bare majorities that we see in Supreme Court decision-making. And, on (iii), it is hard to rig up an argument based on political equality or political fairness that works for unelected judges as opposed to ordinary citizens or their elected representatives. After reflecting on these possibilities, the Essay concludes that, at the very least, defenders of judicial authority should be more tentative in their denunciations of democratic majoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00440094
- Volume :
- 123
- Issue :
- 6
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Yale Law Journal
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 95727152