POWER IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS: CRITIQUE OF A NEW THEORY.

This paper presents the authors' opinion on the article Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational-Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization. Yamaguchi offers a new theory of power in social exchange networks, claiming empirical support superior to that of alternative theories. Internal contradictions are self-defeating to a theory and Yamaguchi's theory (Y's theory) has at least two. Yamaguchi fails to provide a model to specify the value of the coefficient of elasticity of substitution and this failure greatly broadens the range of potentially supportive results. In the computerized Iowa protocol, for instance, the partner offering the best deal is selected automatically which prevents any special commitments or costs of switching partners. However, several factors bias his presentation of the data and each factor reduces the apparent discrepancy between the prediction of Y's theory and the experimental data. Yamaguchi's model simply does not work when the data transformations are done correctly. In sum, contrary to Yamaguchi's claim predictions from his model are inconsistent with results from experimental studies of power in exchange networks.