Analogy in causal inference: rethinking Austin Bradford Hill's neglected consideration.

The purpose of this article was to rethink and resurrect Austin Bradford Hill's "criterion" of analogy as an important consideration in causal inference. In epidemiology today, analogy is either completely ignored (e.g., in many textbooks), or equated with biologic plausibility or coherence, or aligned with the scientist's imagination. None of these examples, however, captures Hill's description of analogy. His words suggest that there may be something gained by contrasting two bodies of evidence, one from an established causal relationship, the other not. Coupled with developments in the methods of systematic assessments of evidence-including but not limited to meta-analysis-analogy can be restructured as a key component in causal inference. This new approach will require that a collection-a library-of known cases of causal inference (i.e., bodies of evidence involving established causal relationships) be developed. This library would likely include causal assessments by organizations such as the International Agency for Research on Cancer, the National Toxicology Program, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. In addition, a process for describing key features of a causal relationship would need to be developed along with what will be considered paradigm cases of causation. Finally, it will be important to develop ways to objectively compare a "new" body of evidence with the relevant paradigm case of causation. Analogy, along with all other existing methods and causal considerations, may improve our ability to identify causal relationships.
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