Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice.

Alessandra Taniesini's 'The Mismeasure of the Self' develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I show, need a normative hook outside the skull to explain their vicious nature. In other words, the 'mis' in the 'mismeasure' of the self demands externalist unpacking.
Competing Interests: No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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