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Joint games and compatibility.

Authors :
Assa, Hirbod
Elliston, Sheridon
Lehrer, Ehud
Source :
Economic Theory; Jan2016, Vol. 61 Issue 1, p91-113, 23p
Publication Year :
2016

Abstract

We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
09382259
Volume :
61
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Economic Theory
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
112357272
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0