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Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate.

Authors :
Ambec, Stefan
Poitevin, Michel
Source :
Review of Economic Design; Jun2016, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p115-143, 29p
Publication Year :
2016

Abstract

A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
14344742
Volume :
20
Issue :
2
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Review of Economic Design
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
115348827
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6