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Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference.

Authors :
Cao, Ruohan
Wong, Tan F.
Lv, Tiejun
Gao, Hui
Yang, Shaoshi
Source :
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security; Dec2016, Vol. 11 Issue 12, p2717-2731, 15p
Publication Year :
2016

Abstract

We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be altered, and hence, no clean reference observation is available to the destination. For this network, we identify a large family of Byzantine attacks that can be detected in the physical layer. We further investigate how the channel conditions impact the detection against this family of attacks. In particular, we prove that all Byzantine attacks in this family can be detected with asymptotically small miss detection and false alarm probabilities by using a sufficiently large number of channel observations if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulability condition. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection of these attacks, demonstrating the value of this physical-layer security technique for counteracting Byzantine attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
15566013
Volume :
11
Issue :
12
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
118249424
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2016.2596140