The clustering analysis of corporate ownership and control contestability based on Shapley value.

The paper discusses the corporate ownership and control contestability of the listed companies in the non-financial industry in Taiwan from 1999 to 2008. The research includes 11,888 samples, from which the direct and indirect control of the majority shareholders of the companies is calculated, and the ultimate control is obtained. It is found that the average control of the ultimate owners in the listed companies (excluding financial companies) in Taiwan is 14.03%. The average control of the first four largest controllers is 29.10%, and the degree of deviation of the four largest controllers is 84.89%. Control contestability affects company supervision and management. This paper also adopts the fixed effect model to discuss the impact of control contestability on company performance. The results show that when the control concentration of majority shareholders is high or when the alliance force of the largest controller is over 38.48%, it will have an adverse impact on company performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]