The Effects of Joint Cost Allocation on Intra-Firm Trade: A Comparison of Insulating and Non-Insulating Approaches.

While it is generally believed that insulating cost allocations help managers focus their attention on their own actions and shield them from the actions of others, non-insulating schemes can have appeal by encouraging teamwork and/or mutual monitoring among divisions. In this paper, we demonstrate that non-insulating allocations can induce fruitful cooperation among parties even when teamwork and mutual monitoring are nonissues. In particular, we show that in the case of intra-firm trade governed by transfer pricing, non-insulating allocations can permit one division to internalize benefits of private information borne by another and thereby alleviate informationinduced trade barriers. Unlike in the traditional case of fostering teamwork, however, the cooperative nature of noninsulating allocation introduced by information differences is distinctly more circumstance-specific. In line with this view, the paper also identifies conditions under which the use of non-insulating allocation shifts divisional incentives in a manner that only adds further tension to trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]