Back to Search
Start Over
Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness.
- Source :
- Economica; Jul2018, Vol. 85 Issue 339, p626-648, 23p
- Publication Year :
- 2018
-
Abstract
- This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government, and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. In contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt, optimal incentiveācompatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants. The optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient's access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest. Incentiveācompatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains. If the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only, then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications. In contrast, transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00130427
- Volume :
- 85
- Issue :
- 339
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Economica
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 130023768
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12216