CEO compensation and mortgage origination in the banking industry.

Abstract: Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study examines the relationship between bank CEO compensation and mortgage origination practices before the 2008 financial crisis. It extends the discussion about the degree of responsibility of executive compensation for the crisis, by testing whether bank CEO equity incentives contributed to the growth in high‐risk mortgages before the collapse of the mortgage market. Research Findings/Insights: Using a unique dataset of comprehensive loan origination records and CEO compensation in an inclusive sample of publicly traded U.S. banks, this study finds strong evidence that CEO compensation vega is positively associated with the riskiness of mortgages before the collapse of the mortgage market and some evidence that compensation delta is negatively associated with the riskiness of mortgages. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study contributes to the understanding of the role of executive compensation in the 2008 financial crisis. Consistent with prior research, it provides further empirical support that compensation vega induces risk‐taking. Moreover, in the context of the financial industry, the findings illustrate the potential adverse effect of high‐vega compensation of bank CEOs, as such compensation may have contributed to the build‐up of high‐risk mortgages prior to the crisis. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Following the financial crisis, a series of policy changes towards regulating and reforming executive compensation in financial firms has been implemented. This study offers important insights for the reform and design of executive compensation in the financial sector. In particular, practitioners and policymakers should examine the incentive structures of bank executives (such as compensation delta and vega) in order to appropriately influence risk‐taking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]