Back to Search
Start Over
The Epistemic Indispensability Argument.
- Source :
- Journal for General Philosophy of Science; Mar2019, Vol. 50 Issue 1, p145-161, 17p
- Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- This article elaborates the epistemic indispensability argument, which fully embraces the epistemic contribution of mathematics to science, but rejects the contention that such a contribution is a reason for granting reality to mathematicalia. Section 1 introduces the distinction between ontological and epistemic readings of the indispensability argument. Section 2 outlines some of the main flaws of the first premise of the ontological reading. Section 3 advances the epistemic indispensability argument in view of both applied and pure mathematics. And Sect. 4 makes a case for the epistemic approach, which firstly calls into question the appeal to inference to the best explanation in the defense of the indispensability claim; secondly, distinguishes between mathematical and physical posits; and thirdly, argues that even though some may think that inference to the best explanation works in the postulation of physical posits, no similar considerations are available for postulating mathematicalia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- ARGUMENT
APPLIED mathematics
INFERENCE (Logic)
MATHEMATICS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09254560
- Volume :
- 50
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 135963741
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9437-9