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Effects of managerial overconfidence on analyst recommendations.
- Source :
- Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting; Jul2019, Vol. 53 Issue 1, p73-99, 27p
- Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- This study investigates the relation between managerial overconfidence and analyst recommendations. The empirical finding shows that analysts are less likely to issue upgrade recommendations for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Similarly, analysts spend a longer time to upgrade stocks associated with overconfident CEOs. The effect of CEO overconfidence on recommendation revisions is non-monotonic. Analysts are more reluctant to upgrade firms with highly-overconfident CEOs. More experienced analysts are less susceptible to managerial overconfidence. Moreover, investors exhibit stronger response to recommendations for firms with overconfident CEOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0924865X
- Volume :
- 53
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 136861514
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-0743-4