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A game theoretic setting of capitation versus fee-for-service payment systems.
- Source :
- PLoS ONE; 10/7/2019, Vol. 14 Issue 10, p1-8, 8p
- Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- We aim to determine whether a game-theoretic model between an insurer and a healthcare practice yields a predictive equilibrium that incentivizes either player to deviate from a fee-for-service to capitation payment system. Using United States data from various primary care surveys, we find that non-extreme equilibria (i.e., shares of patients, or shares of patient visits, seen under a fee-for-service payment system) can be derived from a Stackelberg game if insurers award a non-linear bonus to practices based on performance. Overall, both insurers and practices can be incentivized to embrace capitation payments somewhat, but potentially at the expense of practice performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 19326203
- Volume :
- 14
- Issue :
- 10
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- PLoS ONE
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 139000186
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223672