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THE FUGITIVE: EVIDENCE ON PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT FROM BAIL JUMPING.

Authors :
Helland, Eric
Tabarrok, Alexander
Source :
Journal of Law & Economics; Apr2004, Vol. 47 Issue 1, p93-122, 30p
Publication Year :
2004

Abstract

On the day of their trial, a substantial number of felony defendants fail to appear. Public police have the primary responsibility for pursuing and rearresting defendants who were released on their own recognizance or on cash or government bail. Defendants who made bail by borrowing from a bond dealer, however, must worry about an entirely different pursuer. When a defendant who has borrowed money skips trial, the bond dealer forfeits the bond unless the fugitive is soon returned. As a result, bond dealers have an incentive to monitor their charges and ensure that they do not skip. When a defendant does skip, bond dealers hire bounty hunters to return the defendants to custody. We compare the effectiveness of these two different systems by examining failure-to-appear rates, fugitive rates, and capture rates of felony defendants who fall under the various systems. We apply propensity score and matching techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00222186
Volume :
47
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Law & Economics
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
13966133
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1086/378694