Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*.

It is easy enough to see that this thesis entails Stoljar's no-entailment thesis, at least if we understand phenomenal truths in such a way that if there is no conscious experience (or no conscious being) there are no phenomenal truths. If we have a good argument for dualism about smell experience, dualism about dogs' experience, and dualism about future humans' experience, then we have established mind-body dualism. The view I am most inclined to accept is neither a purely phenomenal spatial functionalism (with only phenomenal roles) or nonphenomenal spatial functionalism, but a combined phenomenal/nonphenomenal spatial functionalism (combined spatial functionalism for short) where reference to space is fixed by both phenomenal and nonphenomenal roles. This response is closely related to Stoljar's objection 5, which says Stoljar's dilemma can be avoided by appealing to a nonphenomenal spatial functionalism. [Extracted from the article]