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Coordination in a retailer‐dominated supply chain with a risk‐averse manufacturer under marketing dependency.
- Source :
- International Transactions in Operational Research; Nov2020, Vol. 27 Issue 6, p3056-3078, 23p, 3 Graphs
- Publication Year :
- 2020
-
Abstract
- In this paper, a combined contract composed of option and cost sharing is proposed to investigate coordination and risk‐sharing issues of the supply chain consisting of a dominant retailer and a risk‐averse manufacturer. Demand faced by the retailer is stochastic in nature and dependent on marketing effort. We adopt the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion to model risk aversion of the manufacturer, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is verified that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto‐improvement. Moreover, the dominant retailer can allocate the system‐wide profit arbitrarily only by option price in the premise of coordination. It is worth mentioning that coordination of the supply chain is reachable only when the manufacturer is low in risk aversion, and the manufacturer's risk aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- SUPPLY chains
INDUSTRIALISTS
COST shifting
RISK aversion
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09696016
- Volume :
- 27
- Issue :
- 6
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- International Transactions in Operational Research
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 143758934
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12520